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Abstract: Although it must be held that it is contrary to the scheme of the recognition and 
enforcement provisions of the Brussels Convention for one Member State to review or “sec-
ond guess” compliance with Article 6 ECHR by the courts of another Member State, we 
cannot accept that English Courts must apply an irrebuttable presumption that a judgment 
given in another Member State cannot have resulted from a violation of Article 6 in excep-
tional circumstances. In the circumstances of the present case, where the procedure of the 
Rotterdam Court permitted the plaintiff to reactivate an action that had been stayed for 12 
years without requiring fresh service of an appropriate process to be effected on the defen-
dant, it would be contrary to the public policy of this country to enforce the Dutch judg-






This case concerns the enforcement of a Dutch judgment in the United Kingdom. It focuses 
on the application of the public policy exception as a ground of refusal under Article 27 Brus-
sels Convention, in case fundamental principles of procedure are violated. Reference is, 
amongst others, made to the Krombach v. Bamberski case of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ).1 From this ruling it is clear that Article 27(1) can only be invoked in exceptional 
cases, for example when a defendant was prevented from putting his case to the court. In the 
present case the English Court of Appeal refuses the enforcement order because the defen-
dant was denied a fair trail in the Netherlands. This is mainly based on the fact that there was 
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the Netherlands to England, was not informed that proceedings had been re-activated and that 
a judgment was rendered. 
 On 1 March 2002 the Brussels Convention was replaced by the “Brussels I” Regulation, 
except when Denmark is involved.2 This does, however, not affect the relevancy of this Eng-
lish judgment, since the applicable rules did not undergo any substantial changes. Article 
34(1) “Brussels I” Regulation, which is the ‘successor’ of Article 27(1), explicitly states that 
a judgment shall not be recognised if it is manifestly contrary to public policy. The Brussels 
Convention did not contain the phrase ‘manifestly’, but it has always been clear from the ex-
planatory Jenard-report, the case law of the Court of Justice and literature, that the public pol-
icy exception has to be applied restrictively. 
 Below the facts and proceedings will be set out in section 2. Section 3 focuses on the de-
cision of the English Courts, and especially that of the Court of Appeal. In section 4 an at-
tempt will be made to reconstruct, on the facts available, what happened in the Dutch proce-
dure. In section 5 the public policy exception relating to procedural issues under the scope of 
Article 27(1) (Article 34(1) Regulation) will be further examined. Section 6 contains some 
concluding remarks on the English judgment and the application of the procedural public pol-
icy exception. 
 
2. Facts and Procedure 
 
Before going into the facts of the case, the Court of Appeal emphasises that the facts are quite 
extraordinary and that the evidence leaves unclear a number of matters that are or might be 
important. Since the judgment was not published in the Netherlands, in first instance this case 
probably did not raise any serious questions of law. 
 Mr. Larmer, the respondent in this appeal case, practiced as a dentist in Rotterdam be-
tween 1978 and 1991. One of his patients was the appellant in this case, Mr Maronier. In 
1984 Mr Maronier commenced proceedings in the District Court of Rotterdam, claiming 
damages in respect of the treatment he had received from Mr Larmer of approximately 
26,800 EUR. The proceedings were duly served on Mr Larmer in the Netherlands, and he 
was represented at law. There was an exchange of pleadings and statements, ending with a 
statement filed by Mr Maronier in 1986. After that the proceedings were stayed for a period 
of twelve years in total. In 1991, when the proceedings had already been stayed for five 
years, Mr Larmer (defendant) moved to England, leaving his address in England with the 
City Hall in Rotterdam and the Dutch Association of Dentists. 
 In July 1998 Mr Maronier instructed his lawyers to pursue his claim. His lawyers wrote a 
letter – which was not put in evidence in the English procedure – to the lawyer that filed a 
defence on behalf of Mr Larmer back in 1984 (which was by the way not the lawyer that is 
mentioned as his attorney in the Dutch judgment). This lawyer replied that the matter was not 
a current matter and that the case did not show in his records. This is probably caused by the 
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torney in the Dutch proceedings) was meanwhile dissolved. Furthermore, he wrote that he did 
not have contact with Mr Larmer for a number of years, adding that according to his informa-
tion Mr Larmer was presently living in England. The lawyer of Mr Maronier later on states 
that when the proceedings were recommenced, the official attorney of Mr Larmer declared 
himself to be ‘incapable’. This means that a solicitor withdraws from a case due to problems 
encountered with his client. These facts are, however, not cleared up and evidenced. 
 The District Court of Rotterdam finally delivers its judgment on December 31, 1999, and 
Mr Maronier is awarded a total amount of the value of about 33,000 EUR. Noteworthy is that 
the judgment explicitly states that Mr Larmer is ‘presently not represented anymore in law’, 
and that it records Mr Larmer as residing in Rotterdam. Mr Larmer only finds out about the 
reactivation of the proceedings and the fact that a judgment is rendered when enforcement is 
sought in England. By that time the period of appeal, which is three months, has already ex-
pired. 
 The Court of Appeal mentions 11 matters that could not be deduced from the evidence, 
but that might nevertheless be relevant for the outcome. On the matters which involve Dutch 
procedural law (what grounds were required for reactivating the action after such a long de-
lay; on what basis the Court permitted Mr Maronier to obtain a judgment in the absence of 
Mr Larmer; what the nature of the time limit placed on the exercise of the right of appeal is 
and whether the Court had any discretion to extend the period), I will give some comments 
from a Dutch perspective (see section 4). 
 
3. The Judgments of the English Judge in First Instance and the Court of Appeal 
 
The English Judge in first instance expresses that the right to an effective opportunity to de-
fend oneself is an important public policy in England as throughout the EU, and that in this 
case Mr Larmer was denied that right. The lawyer of Mr Maronier suggested that Mr Larmer 
should have kept the District Court of Rotterdam notified of his address or kept in touch with 
his lawyers. The English judge marks this as fanciful since no steps had been taken in the 
procedure for five years before Mr Larmer left the Netherlands, and he did notify the City 
Hall in Rotterdam and the Dutch Association of Dentists. The Judge concludes that recogni-
tion of the Dutch judgment is contrary to public policy because the action was revived with-
out notifying the defendant. 
 On behalf of Mr Maronier, two submissions are made to the Court of Appeal. In the first 
place that the Judge in first instance had erred in carrying out a review of whether Mr Larmer 
had received a fair trial in the Netherlands. In the second place that though Mr Larmer might 
not personally be at fault, his lawyers were at fault for withdrawing from the case without 
informing Mr Larmer that the action was being revived. On behalf of Mr Larmer it is con-
tended that Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is violated be-
cause Mr Larmer was not informed on the re-activation of proceedings. Furthermore, a delay 
in pursuing the claim for twelve years should be regarded as an independent violation of Ar-
ticle 6 ECHR. Mr Maronier’s lawyer responds that the Netherlands, as party to the ECHR, is 









                                                
Brussels Convention for one member state to review or ‘second guess’ compliance with Arti-
cle 6 by the courts of another member state. 
 The Court of Appeal sympathises with this last argument, referring to the Solo Kleinmo-
toren v. Boch ruling of the ECJ.3 In this case the ECJ emphasises that one of the fundamental 
objectives of the Brussels Convention is to facilitate, to the greatest extent possible, the free 
movement of judgments by providing for a simple and rapid enforcement procedure. The 
Court of Appeal states that this objective would be frustrated if courts of an enforcing state 
carried out a detailed review of whether procedures in the state of origin comply with Article 
6 ECHR. Procedures differ from state to state and there should be a strong presumption that 
procedures of other countries that ratified the ECHR are in compliance with Article 6. How-
ever, this is not an irrefutable presumption, as the Court of Appeal adds. 
 The Court of Appeal furthermore refers to Renault v. Maxicar in which the ECJ states 
that «it is for the national courts to ensure with equal diligence the protection of rights estab-
lished in national law and rights conferred by Community law».4 The Court of Appeal, how-
ever, reasons there is a distinction between a decision that resolves an issue of substantive 
law and a decision reached by a procedure that violates the fundamental human right to a fair 
trial. To this extend the Court of Appeal refers to Article 27(2) and the Hendrikman v. Ma-
genta Druck case that recognise the importance of the defendant having a fair chance to de-
fend himself.5 The Court of Appeal continues to quote the Krombach v. Bamberski case ex-
tensively.6 In this ruling the ECJ held that recourse to the public policy clause is possible «in 
exceptional cases, where the guarantees laid down in the legislation of the state of origin and 
in the Brussels Convention itself have been insufficient to protect the defendant from a mani-
fest breach of his right to defend himself, as recognised by the ECHR». The remainder of the 
judgment focuses on the question whether such an exceptional case is at hand. 
 On the submission, made in appeal on behalf of Mr Maronier, that the lawyers of Mr Lar-
mer were at fault because they did not inform him that the Rotterdam proceedings had been 
reactivated, the Court of Appeal decides that the lawyers were not under a duty to retain their 
client’s address over the twelve years that elapsed since the action was stayed, nor to seek out 
his address in order to inform him that proceedings had been reactivated. 
 The Court of Appeal expresses its surprise on the fact that the Rotterdam Court permitted 
Mr Maronier to reactivate an action that had been stayed for twelve years without requiring 
fresh service, that full interest was awarded (which vastly exceeded the capital sum awarded) 
for the whole period of the delay whereas this delay was entirely of Mr Maronier’s own mak-
ing, and that the Court apparently does not have discretion to reopen the matter after the three 
months limit for appeal had exceeded whereas Mr Larmer was unaware that the action had 
been reactivated. The Court of Appeal – courteously – adds that there are many matters 
which are unclear on the evidence and that nothing they have said should be taken as criti-
cism of the Rotterdam District Court or the procedure it was applying. The Court of Appeal 





3  Solo Kleinmotoren GmbH v. Boch, Case C-414/92, [1994] ECR I-2237. 
4  Régie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v. Maxicar SPA, Case C-38/98 [2000] ECR I-2973. 
5  Hendrikman and Feyen v. Magenta Druck & Verlag, Case C-78/95 [1996] ECR I-4943. 









                                                
must be quite extraordinary. On the basis of the facts before us, we are driven to the conclu-
sion that Mr Larmer was denied a fair trial in Rotterdam because he was unaware that pro-
ceedings had been reactivated until even the time for an appeal had passed». The Court of 
Appeal concludes that the Judge in first instance was correct to decide that it would be con-
trary to the public policy of England to enforce the Dutch judgment. 
    
4. What happened in the Dutch proceedings? 
 
The facts of this case, that are indeed quite extraordinary and surprising, makes one wonder 
what happened in the Dutch proceedings. Below an attempt will be made to answer some of 
the questions raised by the Court of Appeal concerning the proceedings in the Netherlands.7 
But because the facts are not clear on important points, this can only be done on a more ab-
stract level.8
 In advance it is noteworthy that on January 1, 2002 the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure 
(Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering; hereafter abbreviated as: CCP) was revised. This 
revision was mainly aimed at reducing the duration of proceedings and more in general to 
make proceedings more efficient. The relation between the parties and the court is altered; the 
judge has to participate more actively and parties have the duty to co-operate.9 Maybe, hope-
fully, under the new procedural rules a case like this would not have slipped through. 
4.1 The delay and reactivation of the proceedings 
The English Court of Appeal wonders what the requirements are for reactivating the action 
after such a long delay. The simple answer is: there are no formal requirements for reactivat-
ing an action. Technically there was one continuous procedure, which was delayed for a long 
period of time. The question therefore is not why or under which conditions the action was 
reactivated, but which grounds there were for staying the procedure for such a long time. Un-
der the old Code of Civil Procedure there were no strict and uniform rules on this. Apparently 
the local regulations (‘plaatselijk rolreglement’) of the District Court Rotterdam at that time 
allowed the judge to grant Mr Maronier several or one long stays. According to Article 143 
old CCP the judge sets the deadlines for filing parties’ statements. Paragraph 2 states that if 
parties agree on the deadlines and the postponements the judge will allow them, unless it 
would cause an unreasonable delay. In practice, however, if a party requested for a post-
ponement for whatever reason, the court would grant it, unless the other party filed a protest. 
Furthermore it is important that Mr Maronier was declared bankrupt in 1986, which is a 
ground to postpone proceedings.10 This bankruptcy, however, only lasted less than a year. 
 In 2000 a national court regulation (‘landelijk rolreglement’) was established, which con-





7  See above section 2. 
8  Many thanks to mr. Marc Harreman, Assistant Professor Department of Civil Procedural Law of Erasmus 
University Rotterdam and former lawyer, for his information and assistance in trying to figure out what 
might have happened in the Dutch procedure. Unfortunately I did not succeed in obtaining the judgment 
from the District Court of Rotterdam, which maybe would have shed light on some of the events. 
9  See for a concise overview of the most important changes H.W. Wiersma, Inhaalmanoeuvres van het 
burgerlijk procesrecht, NJB 2002, 6-20. 









                                                
regulation was introduced with the aim to speed up proceedings. In January 2002 this court 
regulation was replaced by a new national regulation based on the revised CCP. Article 133 
revised CCP contains a similar rule as article 143 old CCP. The idea behind the revision of 
CCP as a whole is, however, that the judge has to participate actively and that parties have to 
cooperate, which means the interpretation in practice should be stricter to avoid such long 
delays. 
 What the defendant could have done is request for what is in Dutch procedural law called 
‘verval van instantie’. This is the right of the defendant to have the case removed from the 
court on the basis of undue delay.11 Under the old Code this was possible in case a procedure 
was stayed for more than three years. In practice this was seldom done. Under the new Code 
such a request can be made after one year, and the rules are stricter in order to ensure that un-
due stays will be avoided as much as possible. 
4.2 The absence of the defendant 
The English Court of Appeal also wondered on what basis the Rotterdam District Court per-
mitted Mr Maronier to obtain a judgment in the absence of Mr Larmer. Under Dutch law it is 
possible to proceed without the defendant being present (this is called ‘verstek’) when the 
terms and formalities concerning the service of the document instituting the proceedings have 
been fulfilled.12 I will not go into these requirements, since this was not a case of ‘verstek’.13 
Mr Larmer was initially represented by a lawyer, and between 1984 and 1986 an exchange of 
pleadings and statements took place. So, technically the defendant took part in the proceed-
ings. This goes for the whole duration of the proceedings, so also after the twelve-years de-
lay. In other words: the Rotterdam District Court did not, and did not have to permit Mr Ma-
ronier to obtain a judgment in the absence of Mr Larmer, since it was not regarded as a de-
fault judgment. 
4.3 The time limit on the right of appeal 
Another question of the Court of Appeal on Dutch procedural law was: what is the nature of 
the time limit placed on the exercise of the right of appeal, and did the Court had any discre-
tion to extend that period? From the fact that the Court of Appeal mentions a time limit of 
three months, it is clear that this is in an ordinary appeal. If it had been a default judgment, 
then the time limit to set the judgment aside (‘verzet’) would have been fourteen days from 
the day the judgment was served on the defendant, or from the day he was otherwise in-
formed that a judgment against him was rendered.14 For an appeal against an inter partes 
judgment the fixed time limit is three months from the day the decision was delivered. The 
court does not have discretion to extend this period.15
 





11  Articles 279-284 old CCP (Articles 251-253 revised CCP), which roots back in Article 399 of the Code Na-
poleon; see now Article 388 of the nouveau c.p.c., under which the péremption d’instance operates de droit 
(although the judge can not take it into account ex officio) and no more upon request of the defendant. 
12  Article 76 old CCP (Article 139 revised CCP). 
13  Also in the light of the fact that there was a time limit of three months on the right of appeal, and if it was to 
be regarded as a case of ‘verzet’ (default) other time limits would have been applicable. See also section 4.3. 
14  See Article 81 old CCP (Article 143 revised CCP). 









                                                
5.1 Article 27(1) Brussels Convention (Article 34(1) “Brussels I” Regulation) 
The grounds of refusal, laid down in Article 27 Brussels Convention (Article 34 Brussels 
Regulation), have to be interpreted strictly.16 As the ECJ stated, these grounds constitute an 
obstacle to the fundamental objectives of the Convention, which is to facilitate, to the greatest 
possible extent, the free movement of judgments by providing for a simple and rapid en-
forcement procedure. As for Article 27(1) the Court held in the Krombach case that recourse 
to the public policy exception is only to be had in exceptional cases.17 Article 34(1) Brussels 
Regulation explicitly states that it may only be invoked in case the decision is ‘manifestly’ 
against public policy. Under the Brussels Convention and Regulation, and more in general in 
private international law, public policy has a limited role. It mainly functions as a ‘safety net’ 
that enables a state not to recognise and enforce a foreign decision (or to apply a foreign law) 
that goes against fundamental principles upheld by its legal system.18
 In deciding whether a foreign decision is against public policy, the rules of the state 
seized are decisive.19 So, in this case English public policy was relevant. Although Dutch 
procedural rules at that time apparently made it possible to stay the proceedings for twelve 
years and re-activate it without summoning the defendant again and without him being repre-
sented by a lawyer, the English judge was allowed to review whether recognition of this deci-
sion was in conformity with English public policy.20 Besides violation of the public policy 
envisaged by national rules of the state seized, also violation of fundamental rights or human 
rights – such as the right to a fair trail encompassed in Article 6 ECHR – or Community law 
is covered by the public policy exception.21 The most relevant ruling in respect to the present 






16  See Solo Kleinmotoren v. Boch (note 3); Coursier v. Fortis Bank, Case C-267/97 [1999] ECR I-2543 and 
Krombach v. Bamberski (note 1). 
17  See Case 145/86, Hoffmann v. Krieg [1988] ECR 645, Case C-78/95, Hendrikman and Feyen v. Magenta 
Druck & Verlag (note 5), Krombach v. Bamberski (note 1) and Renault v. Maxicar  (note 4). See also the 
Explanatory Jenard report, comments to Article 27(1) Brussels Convention. Also in literature this view is 
promoted, see inter alia, Dicey M., 551; A. Briggs, The Conflict of Laws, Oxford, 2000, 123; J. Kropholler7, 
392; Gaudemet-T., 244-245. 
18  See the literature mentioned in the previous footnote and A.A.H. van Hoek, annotation to Case C-7/98, D. 
Krombach v. A. Bamberski, CMLR 2001, 1018. 
19  See on inter alia, Kropholler7, 391-392. 
20  See also the Explanatory Jenard report, comments to Article 27(1) Brussels Convention, which states that the 
court where recognition is sought is not allowed to review whether the decision itself is in conformity with 
the public order of its country, but whether recognition of the decision is in conformity with public order.  
21  See the ECJ in Krombach v. Bamberski (note 1); Kropholler7, 392-293; Van Hoek (note 18), who argues 
that the ECJ rules on the maximum content of “public policy” and the ECHR on the minimum content by 
obliging a State party to refuse recognition in case this violates fundamental rights.  
22  Krombach v. Bamberski (note 1). The ECJ concluded that Art. 27(1) does cover the right to be represented 
in one’s absence. The ECJ ruled that: «The Court has consistently held that fundamental rights form an inte-
gral part of the general principles of law whose observance the Court ensures. […] In this regard the ECHR 
has particular significance. […] The Court has thus expressly recognised the general principle of Community 
law that everyone is entitled to a fair legal process, which is inspired by those fundamental rights». The 
BGH in its follow-up judgment in this case refused recognition and enforcement on the basis of violation of 









                                                
 For the application of Article 27(1) it is furthermore important whether the defendant had 
the possibility to oppose the judgment in the country of origin by lodging an appeal or an-
other procedural means to set the judgment aside.23 In this case the defendant factually did 
not have this opportunity since the fixed three months limit for appeal had already expired 
before Mr Larmer was even aware, or could have been aware, of the fact that the action had 
been reactivated. 
 In literature the view is promoted that if a foreign judgment violated human rights, the 
enforcement of this judgment can constitute an independent violation.24 In this case the Eng-
lish Court of Appeal concludes that because Article 6 ECHR is violated, it would be contrary 
to the public policy of England to enforce the Dutch judgment, but it can be concluded from 
its reasoning that the Court indeed promotes the view that granting enforcement would imply 
an independent violation of Art. 6 ECHR, since England is a party to that Convention. 
5.2 The public policy exception and the fair trial requirements of Article 6 ECHR 
The case law and literature on Article 6 ECHR are overwhelming. The European Court of 
Human Rights (EctHR), just like the Court of Justice as regards Article 27(1), uses an induc-
tive method when applying Article 6. It cannot in general be determined what concrete re-
quirements it implies; on a case-by-case basis it is decided whether the abstract requirements 
are met.25 In this paragraph I will only shortly focus on some procedural matters that are most 
important in this case. This is in the first place the long duration of the proceedings (from 
1984-1999). In the second place the right to defend one self, which was according to the Eng-
lish Court of Appeal violated since Mr Larmer was not informed on the occasion of the reac-
tivation of proceedings. And in the third place the fact that in a case like this the defendant 
factually did not have the opportunity to oppose the decision in the Netherlands. 
 As concerns the ‘reasonable time’ period it is clear from the case law of the ECtHR that 
this is not a fixed, absolute period. It depends on several criteria whether the (long) duration 
of a civil procedure is reasonable or not.26 In this case, I think it is indeed clear that the rea-
sonable period requirement is not met. As the English Court of Appeal observed, this is a 
simple negligence case and the delays were the plaintiff’s making, and not the defendant’s 
fault. 
 The right to be heard implies that each party in a civil procedure must be afforded a rea-





23  See e.g. the Dutch decision: Hoge Raad 5 April 2002, RvdW 2002, no 65, see also X.E. Kramer, Dutch Pri-
vate International Law – Overview 1998-August 2002, IPRax 2002, 542. See for a German decision on this: 
BGH, 21 March 1990, IPRax 1992, 33. See also Kropholler7, 395; F. Matscher, Der verfahrensrechtliche 
ordre public im Spannungsfeld von EMRK und Gemeinschaftsrecht, IPRax 2001, 436. 
24  P. Mayer, La Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et l’applications des normes étrangères, RCDIP 
1991, 655; Van Hoek (note 18), 1019; A.P.M.J. Vonken, De reflexwerking van de mensenrechten op het 
IPR, in: P.B. Cliteur and A.P.M.J. Vonken (eds.), Doorwerking van mensenrechten, Groningen, 1993, 171-
172.  
25  Also see Matscher (note 22), 432. 
26  F.G. Jacobs and R.C.A. White, The European Convention on Human Rights, Oxford, 1996, 143-145; D.J. 
Harris, M. O’Boyle and C. Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, Lon-
don/Dublin/Edinburgh, 1995, 222-230; J. Frowein and W. Peukert, Europäische MenschenRechtsKonven-
tion, EMRK-Kommentar, Kehl/Strassburg/Arlington, 1996, 267-279; P. Smits, Artikel 6 EVRM en de civiele 









                                                
disadvantage in relation to his opponent.27 Besides a proper service of the document institut-
ing the proceedings – which is under the Brussels Convention covered by Article 27 (2) (Ar-
ticle 34(2) Regulation) –, the right to adversarial proceedings can also be important in a later 
stage of the proceedings, as is covered by Article 27(1) Brussels Convention (Article 34(1) 
Regulation).28 Although Mr Larmer was properly served with the document instituting the 
proceedings, it is in my opinion clear that he was put at a disadvantage because he was not 
informed on the re-activation of the proceedings. The right to be heard does not cover the 
right to, or obligation of, legal representation in civil cases. In literature this is sometimes 
more generally headed under the right of access to a court, but at the same time it is admitted 
that this is not an absolute right.29 In civil cases legal aid is required only in situations in 
which a person cannot plead his case effectively himself or where the law makes legal repre-
sentation compulsory, and even under these circumstances this is not an absolute right. In my 
opinion in the present case the right of access to a court is not violated because Mr Larmer’s 
lawyer withdrew from the case. It could, however, in my view contribute to the conclusion 
that on the whole the trial was not fair, since the lawyer’s withdrawal was the main cause of 
Mr Larmer not being informed, and the Dutch court should have been aware of this conse-
quence. 
 The right of access to a court does not oblige states to create the possibility to lodge an 
appeal.30 This also means that states are free to limit the possibilities for appeal, for example 
by imposing a time limit. However, if in a certain case the right to oppose a decision by 
means of an appeal exists, this procedure and the access to this procedure should comply with 
Article 6 ECHR. So, it can be argued that since according to Dutch law there was a right of 
appeal, this right was not effected in conformity with Article 6, because Mr Larmer was not 
aware, and could not possibly have been aware, of the fact that he had the right to appeal, un-
til the time limit already expired.31
  
6. Further comments on the decision by the English Court of Appeal 
 
In the initial proposal of the European Commission for the revision of the Brussels Conven-
tion the public policy exception was abandoned, since because of its limited interpretation 
this exception would no longer have a meaning within the European jurisdiction. In subse-
quent drafts, which finally led to the current Brussels Regulation, this exception was never-
theless adopted, with the addition that the judgment should ‘manifestly’ be contrary to public 
policy. I think that indeed the public policy exception only has little relevancy as far as sub-
stantive law is concerned. But for procedural aspects this provision will remain to be impor-
tant, and in the light of the growing importance of Article 6 and the state of civil justice in 





27  Borgers v. Belgium, ECtHR [1993], Series A, no 214; Smits (note 26), 89-107. 
28  See Debaecker v. Bouman, Case 49/84 [1985] ECR I-1779, to which the English Court of Appeal also re-
fers. See also a German judgment: BGH 21 March 1990, IPRax 1992, 33; Kropholler7, 396. 
29  Frowein&Peukert (note 26), 197; Harris, O’Boyle&Warbrick (note 26), 197-198, 216. 
30  Frowein&Peukert (note 26), 209-212; Smits (note 26), 42-45. 









                                                
 What makes this case interesting is that it is one of the first cases in which the Krombach 
case of the ECJ is applied and that the area of the so-called procedural public policy is not yet 
fully crystallized. Article 6 ECHR, the ‘legal conscience’ of European criminal and civil pro-
ceedings, now clearly entered the arena of private international law, and more in particular 
international procedural law. It should be regarded as an independent source for the interpre-
tation of the public policy exception under the Brussels Convention and Regulation. In 
Krombach the ECJ stated that only in exceptional circumstances this procedural public policy 
may be invoked, and in my opinion in the present case such exceptional circumstances were 
certainly at hand. 
 Although not all the facts are clear and evidenced, they leave in my opinion no doubt that 
the Dutch procedure was not in conformity with Article 6 ECHR and – more importantly – 
that the English Courts were right in refusing recognition and enforcement on the basis of the 
public policy exception of Article 27(1) Brussels Convention (Article 34(1) Regulation). I 
think the arguments that are presented by the English Court of Appeal are quite clear, its rea-
soning is convincing and the outcome in conformity with the case law of the ECJ and in par-
ticular the Krombach ruling. Maybe the Court of Appeal could have dug a little deeper into 
what happened in the Dutch procedure to be able to fully assess to which extent fundamental 
fair trial principles were violated, although I do not think that in this particular case a better 
understanding would have led to a different outcome. In my view especially two facts legiti-
mise the refusal of the enforcement order on the basis of the procedural public policy excep-
tion. These are the excessive long duration of the proceedings, which are due to the claimant, 
and the factual impossibility for the defendant to lodge an appeal in the Netherlands.  
 What I found quite remarkable, or even charming, about the judgment of the English 
Court of Appeal, is that after the Court pronounces its deep surprise about what happened in 
the Dutch procedure, it takes efforts to emphasize that this should not be taken as criticism of 
the Rotterdam District Court or the Dutch procedure. Also from the questions and remarks of 
the English Court on Dutch procedure it is clear that civil procedure in the Netherlands and 
England are still quite different, and that a lot of work needs to done to really come to com-
mon principles of civil procedure.32
 It remains to be seen how the procedural public policy exception will develop. There are 
still several questions to be answered and difficulties to be solved concerning its relation to 
Article 6 ECHR. On the one hand it is desirable that the public policy exception is interpreted 
as limited as possible, since this is an obstacle to the free movement of judgments. So, as the 
ECJ ruled and as follows from the wording of Article 34(1) Brussels Regulation, the public 
policy exception has an exceptional character, for example when it is necessary to protect the 
defendant from a ‘manifest breach’ of his right to defend himself, as recognised by the 
ECHR. Article 6 ECHR is recognised as source of the general principles of Community law, 





32  As E. Jayme and C. Kohler (Europäisches Kollisionsrecht 2002: Zur Wiederkehr des Internationalen Privat-
rechts, IPRax 2002, 468) under reference to this Maronier v Larmer case state: «Hier zeigen sich die Gren-
zen des “einheitlichen europäischen Justizraums”. Brüche werden sichtbar, die nicht auf Anlaufschwierig-
keiten, sondern auf Strukturunterschiede zurückgehen, und die schon deshalb nicht durch bloße Rhetorik ü-
berwunden werden können, weil sich die Gewährung von Rechtsschutz im gesamten Binnenmarkt an Art. 6 









                                                
Community law to only allow the public policy exception in case the rights recognised by the 
ECHR were manifestly violated? In literature the question was raised whether the state of 
recognition does not become an ‘accessory’ to the violation of Article 6 if it allows enforce-
ment when the state of origin did not ‘manifestly’ violated them.33 In national procedural law 
Article 6 plays an important role and increases the requirements of fair trial, whereas in inter-
national procedural law its function is marginalized. Of course it is one of the fundamentals 
of private international law that foreign laws and proceedings that differ from one’s own rules 
are to a large extent respected. Furthermore, the integration of the European Union requires 
that the barriers of mutual enforcement of judgment are lowered – under the Regulation the 
grounds of refusal are no longer reviewed in first instance – and finally completely re-
moved.34 But when fundamental principles of fair trial, as recognised by the Article 6 ECHR, 
are violated, we reach an impasse. This brings me back to the present case. As I concluded, 
one of the crucial points is that factually there was no possibility of appeal in the Netherlands. 
If only Mr. Larmer was informed that a judgment was rendered, the Dutch Court of Appeal 
would maybe have reversed whole or part of the judgment of the District Court on applica-
tion by Mr Larmer and the case would not have reached the international level. 
  
Xandra Kramer 





33  Van Hoek (note 18), 1021-1023 (1022). See also specifically on the relationship between Brussels Conven-
tion and ECHR: J. Gundel, Der einheitliche Grundrechtsraum Europa und seine Grenzen: Zur EMRK-
konformen Interpretation des Ordre-public-Vorbehalts des EuGVÜ durch den EuGH, Europäisches Wirt-
schafts und Steuerrecht 2000, 442-448. 
34  See Article 41 Brussels Regulation. See furthermore the Proposal for a Council Regulation creating a Euro-
pean Enforcement order for uncontested claims, COM (2002) 159 final 2002/0090 (CNS), OJEC C 203 E, 
27 August 2002 (see Int’l Lis 2002, Cronache, 58). 
